Abstract. This paper reconsiders the established Merkle-Damgård design principle for iterated hash functions. The internal state size w of an iterated n-bit hash function is treated as a security parameter of its own right. In a formal model, we show that increasing w quantifiably improves security against certain attacks, even if the compression function fails to be collision resistant. We propose the wide-pipe hash, internally using a w-bit compression function, and the double-pipe hash, with w = 2n and an n-bit compression function used twice in parallel.
Our Contributions. This paper describes and analyses failure-friendly iterated hash functions. The goal is to defend against certain classes of attacks even if collision resistance fails. We propose and analyse variants of the MerkleDamgård design, increasing the internal state to w > n bits. The wide-pipe hash is quite similar to the Merkle-Damgård hash, except for using a "largish" w-bit compression function to finally generate n < w bits of output. The double-pipe hash sets w = 2n and employs one single n-bit compression function, used twice in parallel for each message block. In random and standard model settings, we prove the security of our schemes against K-collision attacks (for K ≥ w), and K-way preimage and 2nd preimage attacks (for K ≥ 1). Additionally, we discuss and semi-formally verify the resistance against 2nd collision attacks. Related Proposals. The double-pipe hash may remind the readers of the RIPEMD-family of hash functions [22, 8] , also calling two compression functions in parallel. The hash functions specified in [22, 8] combine both n-bit compression values into a single n-bit state, strictly following the Merkle-Damgård design principle, thus being as failure-unfriendly as any Merkle-Damgård hash function. But [8] also outlines some double-width variants of RIPEMD-128 and -160, which we refer to as RIPEMD-256 and -320. RIPEMD-256 and -320 can almost be viewed as instantiation of our design principle -except for the following:
-By outputting both compression values at the end, RIPEMD-256 and -320 use the two n-bit compression functions like a single 2n-bit compression function -again following the Merkle-Damgård design, thus, e.g., being entirely vulnerable to 2nd collision attacks. -RIPEMD-256 and -320 were proposed as a a convenience feature for applications requiring a 2n-bit hash "without needing a larger security level" [8] . On the other hand, our double-pipe construction has been designed to improve the security against certain attacks.
We propose a generic and failure-friendly design principle providing provable security under reasonable assumptions. Assuming a "good" n-bit compression function, 1 our analysis would justify the usage of, say, a failure-friendly variant of RIPEMD-320 with 2n = 320 internal state bits and n = 160 output bits.
Recently, Coron et al. [5] also analysed variants of the Merkle-Damgård design in a fashion similar to the current paper. One of the proposals in [5] is rather similar to our wide-pipe design. However, [5] aims for variably-sized random oracles, based on an (extremely strong) ideal compression function (i.e., a fixed-size random oracle). This is orthogonal to our approach of taking possible compression function weaknesses into account. Nandi et. al. [18] proposed and analysed a rather different "2/3 rate double length compression function". Both [5] and [18] restrict their analysis to the random and Shannon oracle, while the current paper also provides some analyses in the standard model. Also, none of the constructions in [5, 18] resemble the current paper's double-pipe hash design.
Road map. We first describe Merkle-Damgård hashing and introduce notations, abstractions, and attacks. Section 2 describes and analyses the wide-pipe hash, a modified Merkle-Damgård design with an extended internal state size. Section 3 modifies the wide-pipe hash, introducing and analysing the double-pipe hash. Section 4 investigates the security of a "weakened" double-pipe hash, based on a common construction for compression functions; see Appendix A for the proofs. Section 5 deals with extension attacks and Section 6 discusses our results and their implications. Appendix B provides examples for our hash constructions.
The Merkle-Damgård (MD) Principle for Iterated Hashing
A hash function H takes a message M ∈ {0, 1} * to compute H(M ) ∈ {0, 1} n . (In practice, the length |M | of M may be bounded by some huge constant.) An iterated hash H is based on a compression function C with a fixed number of input bits and splits M into fixed-sized chunks
n and a fixed initial value H 0 . Given M ∈ {0, 1} * , one computes the MD hash as follows: Note that the MD hash function does not provide any resistance against 2nd collision attacks:
Notation, Abstractions, and Attacks
Random Oracles. A fixed-size random oracle is a function f : {0, 1} a → {0, 1} b , chosen uniformly at random. For interesting sizes a and b, it is infeasible to implement f , or to store its truth table. Thus, we assume a public oracle which, given x ∈ {0, 1} a , computes y = f (x) ∈ {0, 1} b . A variably-sized random oracle is a random function g : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} b , accessible by a public oracle.
Equivalently, g is an infinite set of fixed-size random oracles g a : {0, 1} a → {0, 1} b for a ∈ {0, 1, 2 . . .}. We view a fixed-size random oracle as an ideal compression function, and a variably-sized random oracle as an ideal hash function. Shannon Oracle. An ideal block cipher is some invertible random oracle E :
Apart from that, E is uniformly chosen at random. Given x and M , one can ask a Shannon oracle for y = E(x, M ), and, given y and M , one can ask the oracle for x = E −1 (y, M ).
Adversary. As usual in the context of the Shannon and random oracle models, we consider a computationally unbounded adversary with access to either a Shannon or a random oracle. The adversary's "running time" is determined by her number of oracle queries. Our adversaries are probabilistic algorithms, and we concentrate on the expected running time (i.e., the expected number of oracle queries). We will describe the running time asymptotically. When necessary for clarity, we use the symbols O ("big-Oh", for "the expected running time is asymptotically at most") and Ω ("big-Omega", for ". . . at least").
2
Classes of Attacks. Informally, a real hash function H should behave like an ideal one (i.e., like a random oracle). This would not be useful for a formal definition, though (see [4] ). Instead, one considers somewhat simpler security goals for H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n . We consider the following classes of attacks: The first two classes include "traditional" 2-collisions, 1-way preimages and 1-way 2nd preimages. Some applications need protection against the large-Kvariants, e.g., [10, 23, 3] . The third class deals with a very natural assumption for "good" hash functions: even if the adversary somehow -with a great deal of luck, by doing much computational work, or by a mixture of both -has found one collision, it should still be hard to find another one. The poor defence of established hash functions against such attacks has been elaborated above. Facts. Our analysis uses the following facts:
1. Fact: Finding a K-collision for a fixed size random oracle C : {0, 1} n+m → {0, 1} n or for a variably-sized random oracle Model H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n takes time Ω(2 (K−1)n/K ), and finding a K-way preimage or a K-way 2nd preimage for H or C takes time Ω(K2 n ). 2. Fact: Given a collision A = B with C(A) = C(B) for a fixed size random oracle C{0, 1} n+m → {0, 1} n (or H(A) = H(B) for a variably-sized random oracle H{0, 1} * → {0, 1} n ), finding a 2nd collision C = D, C ∈ {A, B} for C (or H) takes time Ω(2 n/2 ).
Initial Values. Like the MD hash, our hash functions depend on the compression function(s) and an initial value (IV). One can set the IV to some fixed ("random") constant. But for our analysis, we will even allow the adversary to actually choose the IV. 3 This makes our results all the more meaningful.
Standard Model Formalism. For a fixed hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n , trivial algorithms to "find" collisions exist: given any M = M with H(M ) = H(M ), output M and M . Collision resistance implies the non-existence of algorithms to "find" collisions. Thus, for a standard model proof of collision resistance, we must refine our formalism. Instead of a fixed hash function, we actually consider a hash function family H : I × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n . Here, I is a finite nonempty set of indices (or "keys"). We assume an index i * ∈ I being chosen uniformly at random, write H(·) instead of H(i * , ·) and consider the fixed hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n as a random member of its family. Fix some RAM model of computation. In any attack game, the adversary is given i * as its first input. We measure the adversary's expected running time over uniformly distributed random i * (and the adversary's internal coin flips, if applicable). To capture a trivial adversary using huge tables, the running time of any program is assumed to be at least linear in the program size.
We formalise compression functions C exactly like hash functions: assume a family C :
α → {0, 1} β and an index i C ∈ I C chosen uniformly at random, write C(·) instead of C(i C , ·), and consider the fixed compression function C : {0, 1} α → {0, 1} β as a random member of its family. An adversary's running time is taken over random i C . If H is defined by iterating C, a random member of the hash family H is defined by i C and some random initial value H 0 , i.e., i * = (i C , H 0 ). Similarly, if H is constructed by applying C and C , then
Recall that in our attacks we even allow the adversary to choose H 0 . The adversary can make this choice after being given i C or (i C , i C ).
The Wide-Pipe Hash: A Modified MD Hash
Constructing a collision-resistant compression function with w > n output bits may be simpler than constructing an n-bit compression function with the same level of collision resistance. The wide-pipe hash uses such a w-bit compression function to generate an n-bit hash value at the end. 4 This approach defeats Joux' attack -and even provides security against all generic K-collision attacks (which treat the compression function as a random oracle). Let H 0 ∈ {0, 1} w be a (random) initial value. Using two compression functions
we compute the wide-pipe hash H: 
Resistance Against K-Collision Attacks
Observe that Joux finds 2 k -collisions in time min{k * 2 w/2 , 2
This tightly describes the security of H, up to the (logarithmic) factor k. Define the composition f : Figure 2 . Make the following two assumptions:
1. C is collision resistant, and 2. f is K-collision resistant.
Under these assumptions, we prove the K-collision resistance of H. 5 For the concrete security analysis, we assume that finding a collision for C takes at least time T , and finding a K-collision for f at least time T (K).
Lemma 1 An adversary needs Ω(min{T , T (K)}) units of time to find a Kcollision for the wide-pipe Hash H, even if she can choose H 0 .
Proof. Any final K-collision is equivalent to a K-collision for f . On the other hand, if a K-collision for H is not a final K-collision, then an internal collision has been found. For all H 0 , finding an internal collision is equivalent to finding a collision for C . Thus, finding a K-collision for H is at least as hard as finding either a K-collision for f , or a collision for C.
In the random oracle model, H is as secure against multi-collision attacks as an ideal hash for w ≥ 2n. Theorem 2. Consider the wide-pipe hash H. Allow the adversary to choose H 0 .
1. Model C and C as independent random oracles. The adversary needs time
. . , x n ) as the n-bit truncation of its w-bit input. Model C as a random oracle. The adversary needs time Ω(min{2 w/2 , 2 n(K−1)/K }) to find a K-collision for H.
Proof. Due to Lemma 1, finding a K-collision takes time Ω(min{T , T (K)}).
By Fact 1, T = Ω(2 w/2 ). If C is an independent random oracle, then T (K) = Ω(2 n(K−1)/K ). If C just truncates, then f can be viewed as a random oracle with n output bits. Again, this gives
Resistance Against K-way (2nd) Preimage Attacks
Joux' (2nd) preimage attack also works for the wide-pipe hash. Its time O(k * 2 w/2 + 2 n ) tightly bounds the security of H, up to the (logarithmic) k. Let T be a lower bound for finding collisions for C (as before) and assume that finding K-way preimages for f takes at least time P (K).
Lemma 3 Consider the wide-pipe hash H. Allow the adversary to choose H 0 .
1. The adversary needs time Ω(P (1)) to find a single preimage for H. 2. She needs time Ω(min{T , P (K)}) to find a K-way preimage for H.
Proof. Finding a preimage for H implies finding a preimage for f . Finding a K-way preimage for H either implies finding at least one internal collision -and thus a collision for C -or a K-way preimage for f .
In the random oracle model, we also consider 2nd preimage attacks. Theorem 4. Consider the wide-pipe hash H. Model C and C as independent random oracles. An adversary allowed to choose H 0 needs 1. time Ω(2 n ) to find a single preimage for H, 2. time Ω(min{2 w/2 }) to find a K-way preimage for H, and 3. time Ω(min{2 w/2 , K2 n }) to find a K-way 2nd preimage for H.
Proof. The first two bounds are direct consequences of Lemma 3 and Fact 1. Now consider 2nd preimages: given a random X ∈ {0, 1} w , we are searching for one or more different X i ∈ {0, 1} w with C (X) = C (X i ). We choose an arbitrary message M with the expansion M 1 , . . . , M L , query the C -oracle for the internal hash values H 1 , . . . , H L , and define
Note that with overwhelming probability X = H L . Now we run the adversary to find single or multiple 2nd preimages for M , replacing C by C . Observe that X is a random value, and, since C is a random oracle, H L is random, too. Thus, C is a uniformly distributed random function just like C -the adversary can't distinguish between C and C . Our little manipulation (replacing C by C for the adversary) does not affect the adversary's probability of success or running time. We write H for the wide-pipe hash function using C and C . If the adversary succeeds, she finds 2nd preimage(s)
w/2 can still run Joux' attack and benefit from the iterated structure of H. In fact, no hash function with some fixed internal state size w can be as secure against multiple (2nd) preimage attacks as an ideal hash.
The Double-Pipe Hash
There is one drawback for the wide-pipe design: its compression function C needs a larger output and finding collisions for C must be much harder than finding collisions for the hash function itself. It would be interesting to use a compression function which only has to satisfy essentially the same security requirements as the hash. For instance, if we assume the internal compression function of, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160, or SHA-256 to be as secure as an ideal 160-bit (256-bit for SHA-256) compression function, can we construct some variant to improve security? Note that the SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160 compression functions can be written as C : {0, 1} 160 ×{0, 1} 512 → {0, 1} 160 , their SHA-256 counterpart as C : {0, 1} 256 × {0, 1} 512 → {0, 1} 256 . Thus, the following construction would be applicable to all of them: Using one single narrow-pipe compression function C : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n+m → {0, 1} n , with m ≥ n and two distinct (random) initial values H 0 = H 0 ∈ {0, 1} n , we compute the double-pipe hash H d :
, we have replaced the wide-pipe chaining values H i−1 ∈ {0, 1} w by pairs (H i−1 , H i−1 ) ∈ ({0, 1} n ) 2 . In each iteration, the value H i = C(H i−1 , H i−1 ||M i ) -one half of the new chaining value -functionally depends on both halfs H i−1 and H i−1 of the old chaining value (similarly for H i ). This is vital for the security of the double-pipe hash. Otherwise, H d (M ) would degenerate into the cascade of two hash functions, thus being vulnerable to Joux' attack. 
Security Against Multiple Collision Attacks
In principle, the double-pipe hash is a special case of the wide-pipe hash with w = 2n and
, where C (H , H ) = H simply truncates 2n input bits to n output bits. (Thus, we do not need to compute the value Figure 3 .) Similarly to our analysis of the wide-pipe design, we distinguish internal collisions from final ones. The improved security of the wide-pipe hash over the plain MD hash depends on internal collision resistance being much stronger than final collision resistance. Unfortunately, this reasoning does not hold for the double-pipe construction. Finding internal collisions with H = H and G = G may be as "easy" as finding collisions for C, i.e., as finding final collisions. To deal with this, we define two special cases of internal collisions, in addition to considering K-collisions, and make the following three assumptions:
1. It is infeasible to find a strict (internal) collision for C, i.e., two triples (H , H , M ) = (G , G , N ) with H = H and G = G , but C(H , H ||M ) = C(G , G ||N ) and C(H , H ||M ) = C(G , G ||N ). 2. It is infeasible to find an (internal) cross collision for C: a triple (H , H , M ), with H = H but C(H , H ||M ) = C(H , H ||M i ). 3. It is infeasible to find K-collisions for C.
We will prove H d to be secure under the above three assumptions. While dealing with strict or cross collisions is unusual in cryptography, these assumptions appear to be natural and reasonable. We analyse the feasibility of finding strict or cross collisions for a random oracle C. For the concrete security analysis, we assume that finding strict collisions takes at least time T s , finding cross collisions at least time T x , and finding K-collisions at least time T (K).
Theorem 5. If we model the compression function C as a random oracle, then finding cross collisions for C needs time T x = Ω(2 n ), and finding strict collisions for C needs time T s = Ω(2 n ),
Proof. First, consider T x . Any triple (H , H , M ) can only be part of a cross collision, if H = H and C(H , H ||M ) = C(H , H ||M ), i.e., with a probability of 2 −n (for H = H ). Thus, we expect to make T x = Ω(2 n ) oracle queries to find a cross collision. Now consider T s . For any triple (G , G , M ) with G = G , the pair (H , H ) ∈ {0, 1} 2n with H = C(G , G ||M ) and H = C(G , G ||M ) is a uniformly distributed 2n-bit random value, chosen independently from all the other C(·, ·||·)-values. If the adversary chooses q different triples (G , G , M ) and makesueries to the C-oracle, then her probability to succeed is 0≤j<q j/2 2n = Ω(q 2 /2 2n ). Thus, we expect to make T s = q = Ω(2 n ) oracle queries to find a strict collision. 
Thus, any non-strict internal collision implies a cross collision.
For claim 2, we argue as in the proof of Lemma 1. A K-collision for H d either reduces to a final K-collision (taking time T (K)), or to an internal collision. By the first claim, an internal collision is either strict (taking time T s ), or is a cross collision (taking time T x ). Proof. The result follows from Theorem 5, Lemma 6, and Fact 1.
Resistance Against K-way (2nd) Preimage Attacks
Our treatment of K-way (2nd) preimage attacks is quite similar to Section 2.2. Let T s and T x be defined as above and assume finding preimages for C to take at least time P (1).
Lemma 8 Consider H d . Allow the adversary to choose H 0 = H 0 .
1. To find a single preimage, the adversary needs time Ω(P (1)).
To find K-way preimages, the adversary needs time Ω(min{T s , T x , T (K)}).
Proof. Claim 1: See proof of Lemma 3 with f (·, ·||·) := C(·, ·||·). Claim 2 follows from claim 1 of Lemma 6. Note that a K-way preimage also is a K-collision.
Theorem 9.
Consider the double-pipe hash H d . Model the compression function C as a random oracle. An adversary who can choose H 0 needs time Ω(2 n ) for finding a single or K-way preimage or a single or K-way 2nd preimage.
The proof of Theorem 9 is quite similar to the proof of Theorem 12 below.
Our results indicate that in the random oracle model, the double-pipe hash H d is asymptotically as secure as the wide-pipe hash with w = 2n.
If we trust an existing MD-hash to meet its security goal, it seems reasonable to use its compression function as the building-block C for the double-pipe hash. But most practical hash (or rather, compression) functions (including the SHAfamily of hash functions, see Table 1 ) suffer from a specific structural weakness: They use a block cipher like function E : {0, 1} n+m ×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , i.e., that for each "key" K ∈ {0, 1} n+m the function E(K, ·) permutates over {0, 1} n , and both E(M, ·) and its inverse can efficiently be computed. A DM compression function C : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n+m → {0, 1} n is defined as follows:
(Here "+" is any group operation over {0, 1} n .) The ability to efficiently compute E −1 M (·) can be useful for the adversary, see e.g. Kelsey and Schneier [13] for examples. Thus, we have to extend our formalism for the security proofs accordingly -by considering a Shannon oracle, instead of a random oracle.
Double-Pipe Hash with DM Compression Function
Some generic attacks against hash functions don't apply in the random oracle model, but are feasible in the Shannon model [13] . Fortunately, this does not pose a problem for the double-pipe hash. Those parts of our analysis of the doublepipe hash which do not assume random oracles are still relevant and applicable. However, trusting those parts of our analysis which treat C as a random oracle would be risky. For this reason, we additionally analyse the double-pipe hash in the Shannon-model. See Appendix A for the proofs of the Theorems below.
Theorem 10. Consider a DM compression function C. If we model E by a Shannon oracle, then T x = Ω(2 n ) and T s = Ω(2 n ).
Theorem 11. Consider H d with a DM compression function C. If we model E by a Shannon oracle, then finding K-collisions takes time Ω(2 (n−1)(K−1)/K ).
Theorem 12.
Consider H d with a DM compression function C. If we model E by a Shannon oracle, then finding a single or K-way preimage or a single or K-way 2nd preimage takes time P (1) = Ω(2 n ).
Resistance Against 2nd Collision Attacks
Note that our definition of a 2nd collision attack assumes the adversary to be given the first collision essentially "for free". This is difficult to handle in the standard model. Thus, we concentrate on the random oracle model.
In general, our hash designs do not protect against 2nd collision attacks: given an internal collision, attacking the wide-pipe or double-pipe hash is as easy as attacking the MD hash. Our design rationale, however, has been to defend against internal collisions, leaving final collisions as the "dotted line", where the hash function is likely to break (if it breaks at all). This is the foundation for the security proofs in the previous sections. In the remainder of this section, we thus focus on the specific case that the adversary is only given a final collision. 
In this section, we consider an attack game giving the adversary even more freedom: choose any H Theorem 13. Consider the wide-pipe hash H. Model C as a random oracle. If C either is an independent random oracle, or the n-bit truncation of its w-bit input, the adversary needs time Ω(2 n/2 ) to win the 2nd collision game for H.
Proof (Sketch).
Recall that we have got a first collision for f , but no collision for C . Finding messages A, B, C, D ∈ {0, 1} * as required implies finding -an internal collision (a collision for C ), taking time Ω(2 w/2 ) > Ω(2 n/2 ), -or a 2nd collision for f , namely intermediate hashes
We argue that finding a 2nd collision for f would take time Ω(2 n ). If the 2nd collision for f includes a collision for C , then we need time time Ω(2 w/2 ) to find it. Else, the 2nd collision is still as hard to find as a 2nd collision for any n-bit random oracle -both when C is an independent random oracle and when C plainly truncates -, thus taking time Ω(2 n/2 ), see Fact 2.
The Double-Pipe Hash: 2nd Collision Resistance
We adapt the attack game from above to the double-pipe hash: choose four arbitrary pairs G = G , H = H ∈ {0, 1} n , receive M, N ∈ {0, 1} m with C(G , G ||M ) = C(H , H ||N ), and provide A, B, C, D ∈ {0, 1} * , with A = B,
, and C ∈ {A, B, D}. 
The intermediate hashes and message blocks constitute a 2nd preimage for C. According to Fact 2, finding such a 2nd preimage takes time Ω(2 n/2 ). See Appendix A for a sketch of the proof.
Discussion
A Variant of the double-pipe hash. To reduce the set of cryptographic assumptions, Preneel [21] proposed to use C : {0, 1} × {0,
n with one extra bit of input. Set
Proofs of security for this variant of the double-pipe hash are very similar to the proofs for H d itself, but without the need to assume finding cross collisions to be infeasible. Two Independent Security Parameters. The main lesson from [11, 13] and the current paper is that the internal state size w of an iterated hash function should be seen as a security parameter of its own right.
Any security architect choosing parameters for a cryptographic hash should choose both w and n according to her specific security requirements. For an application where even a single hash collision would be the ultimate disaster, w = n suffices. If, on the other hand, additional multi-collisions or (multiple or single) preimages or 2nd preimages or feasible 2nd collisions would turn things from bad to worse, w n is recommendable, due to an improved failure mode. 2nd Collision Resistance. For applications such as digital signatures, 2nd collision resistance can have a huge impact on practical security. Our constructions are reasonably 2nd collision resistant. E.g., a double-pipe hash using the MD5 compression function would fail collision resistance due to [26] , but for the double-pipe hash, this attack could only be used to generate final collisions. Accordingly, this double-pipe hash still defeats known exploits that make collisions "meaningful" [12, 17, 14, 15, 7] .
Cascading. The idea to improve the security of hash functions by cascading has been discussed for a long time, see, e.g., [20] . Cascading looks like an obvious technique to improve the security of hash functions -but due to Joux' attack, cascading iterated hash functions is not that useful. On the other hand, the double-pipe construction can be seen as a cascade of compression functions. To this end, our double-pipe construction provides a theoretically sound technique to cascade compression functions instead of the complete hash functions. Summary. This paper takes an abstract and proof-centric look at the design of hash functions. Similarly to [2] , we consider our work a "feasible and useful step for understanding the security" of iterated hash functions, thereby complementing the attack-centric approach [11, 13] . In the spirit of Merkle [16] and Damgård [6] , this paper shows how to compose "good" hash functions, given "good" compression functions. We provide standard model explanations, what it means for the compression function to be "good". Additionally, we analyse the security of our constructions in the random oracle and Shannon model.* set i := 0; clear the logbook; * for all (k, x): mark E k (x) as undefined; • At any time, domain(E k ) denotes the set of points x where E k (x) is still undefined. Similarly we write range(E k ), for the set of points y where E −1 k (y) is still undefined.
• Responding to an oracle query E k (x): * set i := i + 1 * randomly choose y from range(E k ) * append (xi, ki, yi) := (x, k, y) to the logbook; * respond y; • Responding to an oracle query E −1 k (y): * set i := i + 1 * randomly choose x from domain(E k ) * append (xi, ki, yi) := (x, k, y) to the logbook; * respond x; For our proofs, we will discuss the logbook entries (xi, ki, yi). This is without loss of generality: any adversary not following the first two conventions can easily be transformed into an equivalent one following them. And an adversary following the first two conventions cannot distinguish the simulator from a "true" Shannon oracle.
A.2 Internal Collisions
Proof. For the proof, we assume that the adversary does not make more than q ≤ 2 n−1
queries. This is technically correct, since 2 n−1 = Ω(2 n ). Time T x to find cross collisions: a cross collision is described by H i−1 = H i−1 , Mi with C(H i−1 , H i−1 ||Mi) = H i = H i = C(H i−1 , H i−1 ||Mi).
In time q, we can check at most q/2 such triples (H i−1 , H i−1 , Mi) for cross collisions. Now we argue that for q ≤ 2 n−1 , for each such triple the probability px to satisfy Equation 1 is at most 1/2 n−1 . This implies that the expected number of oracle queries we need to make before we get the first cross collision is T x = Ω(2 n ), as claimed. We still have to show px ≤ 2 n−1 . If the adversary's answer involves a cross collision, then, by the above conventions, the simulator's logbook contains two triples (xa, ka, ya) and 
If (w.l.o.g.) a < b, then either y b or x b is a uniformly distributed random value from a huge subset of {0, 1} n :
